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ABSTRACT 
 For years, law enforcement practitioners and policymakers have sought 
innovative ways to reduce crime. But experience has shown that reducing crime without 
retaining the community’s trust—such as through heavy-handed policing—can be 
venomous for society. In New York City, the precision policing model combines 
predictive policing analysis with increased neighborhood coordination to predict crime 
and then uses interventions from neighborhood coordination officers to prevent crimes 
altogether. This thesis examines the precision policing model implemented by the NYPD 
and finds that it has reduced crime and increased community trust in the police, even with 
diminished police resources. This thesis recommends that other law enforcement 
agencies use the precision policing formula of predictive and community policing as an 
effective crime reduction tool while building relationships with the community. 
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In 2014, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) initiated a new means of 
policing after tensions between police and communities were high following various issues 
nationwide. During that time, New York City (NYC) communities were outraged in the 
wake of excessive stop-and-frisk incidents and a high number of arrests, particularly in 
minority communities. The NYPD introduced precision policing, which combined 
predictive policing analysis and community policing in the form of neighborhood 
coordination programs, to reduce crime while building trust between the police and 
communities.  
The NYPD’s precision policing consists of two important components: an 
intelligence-led investigative component and a neighborhood coordination component. 
The intelligence-led investigative side of this policy uses predictive analysis of all crimes 
to identify the small population of criminals who commit most of the violent crimes.1 It 
also identifies small areas on the map with a higher intensity of crime, otherwise known as 
hot spots.2 This new approach targets illegal firearms, precisely identifies gangs, and 
establishes a database for recidivists. The second component connects citizens with the 
police through an initiative known as neighborhood coordination. This program has three 
core goals: to reduce crime further, to promote trust and respect, and to solve problems by 
collaborating with residents. Many small community concerns are being solved 
collectively rather than through strict enforcement of minor crimes. 
The goal of this thesis was to conduct a case study of precision policing, particularly 
to evaluate the NYPD’s strong claims that it has caused a reduction in crime and improved 
trust between the police and community. If these claims proved to be conclusive, enough 
 
1 William J. Bratton and Jon Murad, “Precision Policing: A Strategy for the Challenges of 21st Century 
Law Enforcement,” in Urban Policy 2018 (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2018), 
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/urban-policy-2018-precision-policing-strategy-21st-century-law-
enforcement-11508.html. 
2 “Practice Profile: Hot Spots Policing,” National Institute of Justice, accessed January 11, 2020, 
https://www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails.aspx?ID=8. 
xvi 
evidence might be gathered to develop this model of policing as a smart practice for other 
major metropolitan police departments.  
This study began with selecting four NYC police precincts in four separate 
boroughs comprising residents of disparate racial groups. The community trust within these 
selected precincts was measured using data from civilian complaints filed by NYC 
residents with the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), which was used as a primary 
indicator of trust. Additionally, crimes within these four precincts were analyzed 
statistically; staffing structure, arrest numbers, summonses issued, technology 
advancements, and training mechanisms were tracked to determine whether the crimes 
increased or declined in relation to this model of policing. This thesis found that in the 
early years of predictive policing, all major crimes were reduced. Fewer violent crimes 
were committed even with fewer police officers, arrests, summonses, and stop, question, 
and frisk reports.  
Through statistical analysis of CCRB complaints filed by NYC citizens, data 
showed that the number of complaints had decreased citywide. Additionally, the number 
of these complaints had decreased in the four precincts in question. One conclusion could 
be that trust must have increased because complaints have decreased.  
In analyzing crime statistics and CCRB data before and after the implementation of 
precision policing, this thesis concluded that the constant decline in crime and fewer 
complaints by citizens against the police indicate that trust between the police and 
community increased. However, other variables might have affected this increase in trust. 
For one, the new approach does not utilize arrest numbers as a measure of performance for 
police officers, and it gives officers the power of discretion to resolve many small issues 
without taking enforcement action.  
In this approach, it is vital for the entire police department to develop a mindset of 
community outreach while accurately identifying elements that cause the most violence to 
take enforcement action precisely. The NYPD has used this model of policing for five 
years; however, not much scholarly research and analysis has been dedicated to evaluate 
this policy. At the five-year anniversary of its implementation and given the sample of 
xvii 
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New York City (NYC) has achieved remarkable reductions in crime in recent years. 
For example, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) recorded only 295 homicides 
in 2018 and 292 homicides in 2017, the lowest numbers of homicides recorded in 70 years 
of documented history.1 In contrast, as recently as 1990, 2,245 people died in homicides. 
With the population of NYC estimated to be 8.6 million in 2018, this represents 3.3 
murders per 100,000 people, which is well below the national average of 5.3 murders per 
100,000.2 Overall index crimes, which include violent felonies like rape, robbery, felony 
assault, burglary, grand larceny, and auto theft, also decreased by 13.7 percent, from 
111,135 in 2014 to 95,883 in 2018.3  
Many people attribute this marked success to the adoption in 2014 of a strategy 
known as precision policing. Former Police Commissioner William Bratton said, 
“Precision policing is working to keep crime and disorder under control. Indeed, New York 
is safer than ever.”4 The NYPD’s precision policing consists of two important components: 
an intelligence-led investigative component and a neighborhood coordination component. 
The intelligence-led investigative side of this policy uses a predictive analysis of all crime 
to identify the small population of criminals who commit most of the violent crimes.5 It 
also identifies small areas on the map with a higher frequency of crime, otherwise known 
as hot spots.6 This new approach targets illegal firearms, precisely identifies gangs, and 
establishes a database for recidivists. The second component of this new perspective 
 
1 “Crime Statistics,” New York City Police Department, accessed February 6, 2020, https://www1.nyc.
gov/site/nypd/stats/crime-statistics/crime-statistics-landing.page. 
2 “Home Page,” Census Bureau, accessed February 6, 2020, https://www.census.gov/en.html. 
3 New York City Police Department, “Crime Statistics.” 
4 William J. Bratton and Jon Murad, “How Precision Policing Made New York Even Safer,” New York 
Post, July 29, 2018, https://nypost.com/2018/07/29/how-precision-policing-made-new-york-even-safer/. 
5 William J. Bratton and Jon Murad, “Precision Policing: A Strategy for the Challenges of 21st Century 
Law Enforcement,” in Urban Policy 2018 (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2018), 
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/urban-policy-2018-precision-policing-strategy-21st-century-law-
enforcement-11508.html. 
6 “Practice Profile: Hot Spots Policing,” National Institute of Justice, accessed January 11, 2020, 
https://www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails.aspx?ID=8.  
2 
connects citizens with the police through an initiative known as neighborhood 
coordination. This program has three core goals: to reduce crime further, to promote trust 
and respect, and to solve problems by collaborating with residents. Many small community 
concerns are being solved collectively rather than through strict enforcement of minor 
crimes.  
Before presenting precision policing and its assorted debates in detail, the following 
paragraphs revisit its roots. First, starting in the mid-1980s, the NYPD initially began the 
Community Patrol Officer Program without much top-down support.7 Then, in the early 
1990s, when violent crime was at its peak, William Bratton became the police 
commissioner of the NYPD and introduced a new way of policing that concentrated on 
low-level quality-of-life offenses such as petty crimes and vagrancy.8 This new way of 
policing stemmed from George Kelling’s broken windows theory, which argued that 
preventing minor crimes would reduce the likelihood of more violent crimes.9 Bratton’s 
strategy proved successful in reducing quality-of-life issues and violent crimes, making 
New York a more livable city.10 The NYPD experienced a correlation between high 
enforcement and reduced crime as it introduced “Operation Impact,” an extension of 
broken windows–style policing.11 However, over the course of many years, an 
extraordinary level of enforcement and overenthusiastic use of stop, question, and frisk 
frayed the bond of trust between the NYPD and the public.12 Thus, the unintended 
consequence of this policy undermined its effectiveness. 
 
7 Vera Institute of Justice, The Community Patrol Officer Program (New York: Vera Institute of 
Justice, 1984), https://www.vera.org/publications/the-community-patrol-officer-program-a-pilot-program-
in-community-oriented-policing-in-the-72nd-precinct-progress-report. 
8 William J. Bratton and Peter Knobler, Turnaround: How America’s Top Cop Reversed the Crime 
Epidemic (New York: Random House, 1998). 
9 George L. Kelling and William H. Sousa, Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact of New York 
City’s Police Reforms, no. 22 (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2001), 32. 
10 Bratton and Knobler, Turnaround. 
11 Dennis C. Smith and Robert Purtell, An Empirical Assessment of NYPD’s “Operation Impact”: A 
Targeted Zone Crime Reduction Strategy (New York: New York University, 2007), https://marroninstitute.
nyu.edu/uploads/content/Dennis_Smith_Impact_Zone_Policing_Report.pdf. 
12 Shamrik Walton, “Zero Tolerance Policing: An Evaluation of the NYPD’s Use of Stop and Frisk” 
(PhD diss., Northeastern University, June 2014), 74, https://repository.library.northeastern.edu/files/
neu:336406/fulltext.pdf. 
3 
In 2014, after a couple of police-involved shootings led to nationwide protests and 
riots, the NYPD recognized the need to reduce crime effectively while engaging positively 
with its communities.13 Thus, the NYPD introduced a new methodology known as 
precision policing that caused many internal organizational changes and new ways to 
reduce crime while building trust with the communities.  
One critical action in the implementation of precision policing was the 
reorganization of various investigative entities to unite them toward one common mission. 
Previously, investigations conducted by the Organized Crime Control Bureau detectives 
were not shared with other investigative units, specifically in the Detective Bureau (DB).14 
The NYPD addressed this problem by simply uniting organized crime investigations such 
as gang investigations and narcotics investigations with DB investigations, homicides, 
shootings, robberies, burglaries, and other criminal investigations. In 2016, all 
investigative operations, including the Organized Crime Control Bureau, were unified 
under the DB umbrella.15  
Since precision policing has neither been widely studied from an objective 
perspective nor been validated as an effective crime reduction practice, it bears 
investigation. Before it can be exported to other cities, the components of its success or 
weakness need be to evaluated to determine whether it could be a smart practice for other 
municipalities. Eugene Bardach defines a practice as “a tangible and visible behavior.”16 
A practice could also be a description of how such a practice requires an action to reach an 
objective. Bardach explains further that “some ideas are particularly clever. The practices 
 
13 Justin Nix and Scott E. Wolfe, “Sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect: The Role of Managerial 
Organizational Justice,” Journal of Criminal Justice 47 (December 2016): 12–20, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jcrimjus.2016.06.002. 
14 Ashley Southall, “New York City Police Reorganizing to Focus More on Gangs,” New York Times, 
February 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/nyregion/new-york-city-police-reorganizing-to-
focus-more-on-gangs.html. 
15 Southall. 
16 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2004), 126. 
4 
that embody them we call ‘smart practices.’”17 The simple tool in a smart practice is its 
potential to reach a goal at low cost.18 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How might the NYPD precision policing model constitute a new smart 
practice? 
2. What are the intended and unintended consequences of precision policing? 
3. Based on the evaluation of the components of the precision policing model 
used by the NYPD, can the model be developed into a smart practice for 
other municipalities? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review addresses two areas that constitute precision policing: 
intelligence-led policing to reduce crime, and neighborhood coordination, which is a form 
of focused community policing. The first part of the literature review discusses 
intelligence-led policing and how it led to the era of predictive policing, as well as how the 
NYPD utilized data-mining and crime data analysis to understand trends, patterns, and 
recidivism to reduce crime. The second part of the review focuses on neighborhood 
coordination and how it transitioned from community policing with some specific 
differences in the application of the previous community policing model.  
1. Intelligence-Led to Predictive Policing 
The word intelligence is often confused with the word information; however, 
intelligence is more than mere information. According to Mark Lowenthal, intelligence is 
an eight step process that moves in a cycle, starting with identifying requirements; 
collecting, processing, analyzing, producing, disseminating, and consuming data; and 
 
17 Bardach, 126. 
18 Bardach. 
5 
providing feedback.19 According to Marilyn Peterson, law enforcement intelligence was 
adapted from military intelligence, which dates back to ancient times, and had been used 
within law enforcement agencies from the 1970s until about 2001.20 Peterson explains 
further that security intelligence was reformed for use in law enforcement agencies after 
World War II. Communications intelligence systems used by the military provided 
guidance for how police would analyze telephone records as well as practices used to gather 
human intelligence through confidential informants.21 But the concept of “intelligence-led 
policing” began in the 1990s with the Kent Constabulary in Great Britain in response to 
increased property crimes. The Kent Constabulary focused enforcement on repeat 
offenders, successfully reducing property crimes by 24 percent.22 Based on this success, a 
newer model of policing emerged that used data and information to evaluate trends and 
crime issues, in keeping with a business model.23 This evaluation process allowed top 
decision makers to effectively and efficiently deploy resources and develop crime control 
strategies.24  
Finally, intelligence-led policing aims to reduce crime through a top-down 
management approach and by combining the analysis of crime with intelligence.25 It 
focuses on the repeat and serious offenders to allocate police resources effectively, based 
on criminal behavior patterns.26 The ultimate goal of intelligence-led policing is to prevent 
crime proactively instead of reacting to crimes after they occur.  
Predictive policing is one of the policing practices that evolved from intelligence-
led policing. It employs a similar intelligence collection and dissemination cycle to extract 
 
19 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 7th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 
2017), 74. 
20 Marilyn Peterson, Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture (Washington, DC: 
Department of Justice, 2005), 12, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf. 
21 Peterson, 12. 
22 Peterson, 15.  
23 Peterson, 15. 
24 Peterson, 16. 




data from various sources and analyze them to project future crimes.27 Charlie Beck, 
former chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, described predictive policing as “the 
predictive vision [that] moves law enforcement from focusing on what happened to 
focusing on what will happen and how to effectively deploy resources in front of crime, 
thereby changing outcomes.”28 
Predictive policing applies analytical tools, specifically quantitative methods, to 
solve past crimes through statistical predictions of behavioral patterns or to identify 
individuals who are predisposed to criminal activity and target them for intervention.29 For 
decades, the police have used arithmetical and geospatial analysis to estimate crimes. 
However, advances in information technology, collection, and analysis of data have made 
projections an easier and more popular crime prevention tool.30 Police departments use 
analytical tools previously used by large businesses to study and predict customer behavior. 
For example, Walmart has used these analytical tools to stock certain items in the same 
grocery aisle during hurricanes based on previous sale trends.31 Similarly, police agencies 
analyze information about previous crimes and other relevant intelligence to forecast and 
prevent future crimes. Statistically, strong evidence supports the predictability of crime 
based on criminals’ past behaviors.  
Criminals, for the most part, tend to commit crimes within their comfort zone, 
meaning they repeat the same crimes in the same vicinity that they have successfully 
committed crimes in the past.32 According to Tayebi and Glasser, predictive policing 
represents a new paradigm in the analysis of crimes and their trends by systematically 
examining co-offending networks for multiple approaches to criminal collaboration. It also 
 
27 Beth Pearsall, “Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?,” National Institute of Justice 
Journal no. 266 (June 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov.pdffiles1/nji/230414.pdf. 
28 Pearsall, 17. 
29 Walt L. Perry, Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 35. 
30 Perry. 




provides decision-making capabilities to the leadership to deploy resources and make 
tactical police decisions. With more data collection and the rise of new data science, a new 
model of predictive policing has emerged from crime analysis to study criminal behaviors, 
identify crime hot spots, and make accurate predictions.33 
2. Community Policing to Neighborhood Coordination 
Community policing combines three components: “community partnership, 
organizational transformation, and problem solving.”34 The goal is to develop solutions, 
increase trust between the police and community, and solve problems collaboratively. The 
mechanism of problem solving needs to be proactive and systematic, not to mention 
routinely involve community members and groups.35 Despite a volume of literature that 
evaluates community policing, its definition differs among police departments. Scholars 
and practitioners agree that combatting crime requires the key elements of collaborating 
with the community and solving problems actively. Building on that definition, the 
Department of Justice defines community policing as “a philosophy that promotes 
organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-
solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public 
safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”36 Thus, this policing model 
recognizes that police alone cannot solve the public’s safety issues and promotes a 
continuous partnership to do so more effectively.  
The NYPD had previously implemented a plan from 1984 to 1994 that closely 
resembled community policing but inadvertently created friction between police officers 
and a disconnect between the police and community. The NYPD’s implementation of the 
initiative known as community police officer on patrol (CPOP) involved only a small 
 
33 Mohammad A. Tayebi and Uwe Glasser, Social Network Analysis in Predictive Policing (New 
York: Springer, 2016), 7–8. 
34 Community Oriented Policing Services, Community Policing Defined (Washington, DC: 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014),16, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=766797.  
35 Community Oriented Policing Services. 
36 Community Oriented Policing Services, 1.  
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number of police officers engaging with community members.37 Connecting police officers 
to local residents and businesses achieved many objectives of this program—as the police 
officers became more familiar with the local residents on their beats, community problems 
were not only identified but also rapidly resolved there. The implementation of this 
initiative was not uniform across the department, and only a small number of officers in 
each precinct performed CPOP duties. Not only did it create a divide among the police 
officers, but it also failed as a crime reduction tool and in its mission to connect police with 
communities, as set out in the implementation.38 According to William Bratton, the NYPD 
had assigned a small number of officers to CPOP to interact with community members 
while most police ran from one 9-1-1 call to the next.39 This initiative split regular police 
officers from CPOP because each group disengaged from the work of the others. Patrol 
officers felt removed from community affairs just as CPOPs lost their day-to-day policing 
perspective. Consequently, this community policing model of the 1990s failed to gain 
much traction. Therefore, the program failed to connect the police to the community or the 
community to the police in a meaningful way. 
This disconnect and approach to policing became a hot topic in the 1993 mayoral 
elections when Rudy Giuliani equated police work with social work incapable of crime 
reduction.40 After his victory, Giuliani appointed William Bratton as the police 
commissioner to change policing from CPOP to a more proactive model. After 1994, 
Bratton began many initiatives that changed policing and reduced crime in NYC. One of 
those controversial initiatives is known as broken windows policing.41 
 
37 Walton, “Zero Tolerance Policing,” 30. 
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In the mid-1990s, the NYPD moved from one end of the spectrum—community 
policing—to the opposite when it adopted broken windows policing. 42 It applied 
aggressive policing without giving police officers the power of discretion and pressured 
officers to enforce every minor offense with the goal of reducing more violent crimes.43 
The city saw violent crimes start to decrease after the new policy was implemented. It also 
made the quality of life better for the residents and visitors of NYC as it helped clean up 
many uncomfortable sights, such as street prostitution, squeegee men, public gambling, 
dice games, and narcotics sales.44  
The effects of broken windows policing on crime and disorder were tremendous 
under Bratton. Bratton’s successors—Howard Safir, Bernard Kerik, and Raymond Kelly—
continued this style of policing and kept driving the crime numbers lower.45 In 2002, when 
Raymond Kelly became the police commissioner, he not only supported broken windows 
policing but also added more fuel to this program by starting a new initiative known as 
Operation Impact.46  
As the NYPD under Kelly believed in a strong correlation between heavy 
enforcement and crime reduction, Operation Impact, also known as the hot spot method of 
policing, deployed police officers to identified high-crime areas.47 When the NYPD 
conducted an analysis to identify the concentrated violent crime zones, or impact zones, it 
identified 30 in the city. The root of this operation was to assign and deploy nearly all 
recruits who had recently graduated from the police academy.48 
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In 2004, the first year of Operation Impact, police officers issued 3.6 million 
summonses and arrested 351,801 offenders for various misdemeanors and felonies.49 
These figures were an increase from the previous year, when officers issued 3.5 million 
summonses and made 334,163 arrests for similar crimes.50 With a numeric increase of 
120,592 more summonses and 17,638 more arrests, the NYPD’s initial assessment was that 
high enforcement correlated with low crime numbers, especially for murders, robberies, 
and assaults. During the years of Operation Impact and its increased enforcement measures, 
crime declined further, and Commissioner Kelly thought that its continued application was 
the only successful solution for crime reduction in New York.51  
Operation Impact lasted from 2004 to 2014. What started out as a quality-of-life 
initiative became a 10-year nightmare for the residents of the city. Instead of examining 
true root causes and innovating with newer crime fighting tools, the NYPD attempted to 
solve crime problems with the hammer of more enforcement. Commissioner Kelly 
launched Operation Impact as a productivity measurement tool and started to quantify how 
police officers were spending their tours of duty. The standard to measure performance 
was the number of arrests, summonses, and stop reports.52 This tactic turned police officers 
into revenue-generating robots, and it did little to encourage police officers to know and 
build relationships with the community members they served. The pressure to enforce 
every offense negatively affected the way police interacted with the communities they 
served during that decade.53 
To strengthen the relationship between the police and community, in 2014, the 
NYPD implemented a neighborhood coordination program, which merged the functions of 
patrol and community officers so that the entire department—rather than a small number 
of designated officers—would be involved in the community. The NYPD restructured 
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police precincts to four or five sectors from the previous eight to ten sectors. Sectors 
conformed with actual neighborhood boundaries, establishing a connection between the 
residents and the police officers. Police officers became permanently assigned to these 
sectors, interacting daily with the same community residents.  
In addition to permanent patrol officers, two-officer teams, known as neighborhood 
coordination officers (NCOs), worked in each sector.54 According to a plan of action 
detailed by then–Commissioner William Bratton, NCOs—along with other patrol officers 
and the residents—played an important leadership role in each sector as they identified 
crime trends, local patterns, and other issues and found solutions to these problems. NCOs 
answered calls for service during their shifts, but most of their time involved generating 
contacts with the community to form cooperative planning measures. NCOs analyzed 
crime conditions and developed intelligence about local criminals and where to deploy 
targeted enforcement.55 The NCOs received training in problem solving as investigators 
and community outreach workers. The NYPD expected them to become problem solvers 
by actively working with community groups as well as answering calls and following up 
on current and previous crimes.56 The NCOs received in-depth training in public speaking, 
social services, mediation, street narcotics identification, and enforcement. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis presents a detailed review and analysis of the precision policing model 
implemented by the NYPD in 2014. The NYPD has credited precision policing with 
historic crime reduction and improved community relations as it connects with the 
residents through a component called neighborhood coordination.  
This thesis offers a comparative analysis of four NYPD precincts—33rd, 43rd, 
67th, and 100th—that were early adopters of this new methodology. These four precincts 
represent four different boroughs of NYC as well as different diversity and ethnic groups 
 
54 Bratton, The NYPD Plan of Action, 5. 
55 Bratton, 5. 
56 Bratton, 5. 
12 
among their residents. Data from before and after the adoption of precision policing were 
examined to analyze its effects on crime in each of these four precincts. This comparative 
analysis used multiple statistics, including crime rates, arrest rates, technology, training, 
and staffing structure, to indicate changes in numbers before and after the implementation 
of this policy.  
Furthermore, this thesis analyzes the degree to which precision policing has 
affected relationships between the police and community. The NCO, a role that evolved 
from community policing, was studied to pinpoint how it helped the NYPD regain 
community trust. One indicator of such trust was the number of civilian complaint reports 
filed by the public with the NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB). This 
comparison involved evaluating the number of complaints against police officers before 
and after the implementation of precision policing. In selecting four different precincts, 
this thesis attempted to make the study as generalizable as possible. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW  
Chapter II describes several organizational and structural changes the NYPD has 
put in place in recent years to unify all the department’s resources under a single 
investigative chain of command. This chapter argues that because of the unification 
brought to all investigations, the NYPD has attained better coordination among 
investigative units, a prerequisite for predictive policing.  
Chapter III describes the first component of precision policing: predictive policing 
analysis. This chapter provides a historical perspective to help the reader understand the 
circumstances that led the NYPD toward this new approach. This chapter also presents a 
statistical analysis of crimes within four police precincts to determine whether this new 
model contributed to an increase or reduction in crime.  
Chapter IV describes the second component of precision policing: neighborhood 
coordination. This chapter describes various models of policing previously implemented 
by the NYPD to develop trust between the police and communities. It then measures 
community trust by presenting a comparative analysis of civilian complaints filed against 
police officers before and after the implementation of the policy.  
13 
Chapter V analyzes whether the NYPD’s precision policing model might be 
considered a “smart practice” that could be adopted by other municipalities. Chapter VI 
then concludes the thesis by reviewing the findings of the research and making four 
recommendations for future research. These recommendations could be beneficial in 
further reducing crime and enhancing relationships with the public.  
14 
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NYPD’S PRECISION POLICING 
This chapter details the restructuring of the resources within police precincts and 
the unification of investigative units under precision policing. The chapter examines and 
defines how the previous model of disparate investigations transformed into the new 
unified investigative model. It also details the structure of many units within all police 
precincts before and after the implementation of precision policing. Finally, the chapter 
focuses on the benefits and challenges of the staffing restructuring in both models to reveal 
whether increased staffing led to crime reduction after the implementation of precision 
policing.  
A. INVESTIGATIVE UNITS OF THE PREVIOUS MODEL 
Before detailing previous models and approaches, defining such investigative 
entities is important. 
(1) Detective Bureau 
The Detective Bureau of the NYPD detected and investigated crimes to prevent 
future violence. The Detective Bureau investigated homicides, shootings, serious assaults, 
rapes, robberies, and burglaries.57  
(2) Organized Crime Control Bureau  
After the Knapp commission hearings examined a corruption scandal, followed by 
a recession and a push toward a more professional police department, massive restructuring 
took place in the 1980s.58 The Organized Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) was formed to 
address widespread corruption, mismanagement within the NYPD, public trust, and drug 
enforcement.59 The creation of this new bureau resolved many of the aforementioned 
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concerns. The OCCB primarily conducted investigations for narcotics, gangs, vice 
enforcement, auto crime, firearm suppression, and organized crime investigations. A three-
star chief or deputy commissioner who reported directly to the chief of the NYPD oversaw 
this department.60  
(3) Narcotics Division 
The Narcotics Division worked within the OCCB and dealt with enforcement and 
the dismantling of narcotics organizations. The primary investigative tool used by the 
narcotics division was the buy-and-bust operation through undercover officers to reach the 
highest source of organizations and cartels.61  
(4) Gang Division 
The Gang Division also fell under the hierarchy of the OCCB and was primarily 
responsible for identifying members of gangs and crews and establishing a plan to 
dismantle organized criminal groups through intelligence, enforcement, and well-
collaborated prosecutions. The Gang Division worked with local schools, community 
members, and social media to identify and monitor the activities, recruitment strategies, 
and motivational factors that led these crews and gangs to commit acts of violence.62  
B. PRECINCT STAFFING IN THE PREVIOUS MODEL 
The NYPD also changed and restructured precinct personnel after the 
implementation of precision policing under the NCO component. Previously, the following 
units were part of every precinct.  
 
60 New York City Police Department. 
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(1) Conditions Unit  
Conditions Units addressed local problems ranging from quality-of-life problems 
to various crimes. The police officers assigned to Conditions Units worked in uniform and 
addressed all local problems by issuing summonses and effecting arrests.63 
(2) Street Narcotics Enforcement Unit  
The Street Narcotics Enforcement Unit (SNEU) addressed local narcotics issues 
within a precinct by directly observing either narcotics sales or use. Unlike the Narcotics 
Division, the SNEU did not use undercover officers and confidential informants to 
purchase narcotics. The SNEU remained within a precinct and relied strictly on 
observations before taking any enforcement actions.64  
(3) Anti-crime Unit  
Anti-Crime Unit officers patrolled in plain clothes and addressed crimes of robbery, 
burglary, and weapons in progress. This unit remained intact, even after the implementation 
of precision policing.65  
(4) Impact Unit  
Impact Unit police officers also worked in uniform and foot-patrolled a small area 
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C. COMPSTAT  
The NYPD started using computer statistics (CompStat) in 1994.67 CompStat 
meetings occurred on a weekly basis and served as a management tool for the top brass to 
question local precinct commanders about resource deployments, crime spikes, and 
investigations into various violent crimes.68 The top brass also uses this forum for future 
crime-control strategies. By discussing crime and personnel accountability, the NYPD used 
this forum to disseminate crime-control strategies to the entire police department.69  
D. PREVIOUS MODELS 
The NYPD’s previous model had two investigative bureaus responsible for 
criminal investigations; see Figure 1. Both bureau chiefs reported to the chief, the highest 
uniformed member of the police department. All organized crimes that included narcotics, 
gangs, vice, or vehicles were investigated by the chief of the OCCB. All other crimes, 
including homicides, shootings, serious assaults, robberies, and burglaries, were 
investigated by the chief of detectives.  
 
Figure 1. Previous Model for Chief Reporting 
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In many instances, homicides and shootings, for example, were motivated by either 
gangs or the narcotics trade. Having two different bureau detectives work to resolve the 
same crime could have worked; however, as they worked for separate chiefs, little 
collaboration happened in these investigations. The detectives assigned to the DB focused 
only on the identification of the perpetrator without much knowledge or expertise in the 
root cause of the crime. Without a means to identify the root cause, future violence was 
difficult to predict, and accurate focus was difficult to develop.70  
The detectives from Narcotics and Gang Units conducted investigations from their 
perspective, which was never shared with DB detectives. In the previous model, CompStat 
had been used as an accountability forum to ensure that various detectives from these units 
working the same investigation had been sharing information. However, CompStat failed 
to meet its intended purpose because OCCB detectives did not understand DB 
investigations, and DB detectives did not understand those of the OCCB. Therefore, 
detectives from these two investigative bureaus did not share valuable investigative 
information to determine the root cause of violent criminal behavior and stop further 
retaliatory violence.  
E. THE CURRENT NYPD INVESTIGATIVE MODEL 
Under the current investigative approach, both the DB and OCCB were merged 
under the chief of detectives to eliminate the OCCB’s chief position.71 Additionally, the 
DB created new units to oversee gun crimes and suppress gun violence.72 With this new 
approach, the chief of detectives created violence reduction task forces, comprising 
precinct detectives, patrol officers, gang detectives, narcotics detectives, and others, to 
target violent groups and investigate them comprehensively.73 One goal achieved by this 
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restructuring was improved coordination between all investigative units.74 In this new 
investigative model, various expert detectives could identify the organizational structure 
of different street gangs involved in the narcotics trade as well as shooting incidents that 
were initiated for protection or in competition with rival gangs.75 Figure 2 is an 
organizational chart that explains the new chain-of-command structure. 
 
 
Figure 2. Current NYPD Investigative Model76 
(1) Borough Investigative Chiefs 
Under the current investigative approach, Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens have 
been divided into north and south boroughs due to their large size and populations; Bronx 
and Staten Island have not been divided. In each of these eight boroughs, designated 
investigative chiefs coordinate all investigative work and bring uniformity to all 
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investigations. These investigative chiefs oversee local precinct Detective, Gang, 
Narcotics, Homicide, and Overdose Squads.77  
(2) Gang Squad  
Gang Squad detectives work closely with schools, community groups, and other 
law enforcement members to identify local gangs and crews. They also monitor social 
media constantly for gang and crew identification. Their primary goal is to develop 
actionable intelligence upon learning about such gangs or crews and advance that 
knowledge into targeted enforcement that leads ultimately to prosecution. These detectives 
study methods of recruitment, gang-motivated crimes, and gang activity on a daily basis.78 
(3) Narcotics Borough  
Narcotics Borough detectives work within each respective borough and conduct 
investigations and enforcement based on narcotics complaints either from the community 
or other law enforcement partners. Most of their investigations begin with street-level 
narcotics enforcement with the goal of dismantling narcotics organizations.79 
(4) Precinct Detective Squad  
Precinct Detective Squads (PDSs) work from each precinct, 77 in total, and 
investigate most of the crimes within that precinct. Precinct squad detectives investigate 
everything from shootings to homicides to petty theft and work closely with patrol and 
other investigative units to investigate, solve, and prevent crimes.80 
F. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF THE UNIFIED INVESTIGATIVE 
MODEL 
The unification of investigative units under a single chain of command has some 
benefits. With the new structure, one chief presides over the flow of information and takes 
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responsibility for investigations. With the current model, during homicide investigations, 
many stakeholders target the enforcement efforts against rival gangs or narcotics crews to 
dismantle them effectively.81 As a result, police more precisely identify these gangs and 
crews to disrupt their trade more quickly.82  
This unification also opens new avenues for prosecutions in local and federal 
courts. Traditionally, PDS detectives responsible for conducting most violent 
investigations had not been knowledgeable about federal statues and the nexus between 
local shooting incidents and gangs that could lead to further violence. Detectives assigned 
to units of the OCCB had extensive knowledge of federal and local prosecutions to 
eliminate criminal enterprises. Unifying investigative entities has been a proven tool in 
crime reduction because PDS detectives and gang detectives work jointly toward the same 
mission.83  
Although many benefits accompany this new model, some challenges still exist. 
One of the biggest challenges is that detectives from one respective field do not always 
recognize the perspectives and expertise of their colleagues from another field. Many major 
investigations have many common motivations. For example, detectives from various 
backgrounds come together in an investigation when a homicide victim is part of a gang 
and has been shot due to a narcotics-related territorial dispute with a rival gang member. 
However, detectives working in narcotics, gang, and vice enforcement have no 
understanding of actual homicide investigations, and homicide detectives understand little 
of the others’ investigations. The new unified investigative model is an important 
component of the targeted approach adopted under predictive analysis policing. With this 
unification, multiple specialist detectives contribute simultaneously toward the 
identification of motive and the development of recidivist patterns to stop further violence. 
These unified investigative efforts, combined with predictive analysis as discussed in 
 
81 Tina Moore, “NYPD Shakes up Mafia Investigation Unit,” New York Post, February 9, 2016, 
https://nypost.com/2016/02/09/nypd-shuts-down-mafia-investigation-unit/. 
82 Rafael A. Mangual, “No, NYC Can’t Afford to Stop Tracking Gang Members,” New York Post, 
December 24, 2019, https://nypost.com/2019/12/24/no-nyc-cant-afford-to-stop-tracking-gang-members/. 
83 Bratton, “NYPD up to the Challenge.” 
23 
Chapter III and combined with community outreach intervention as discussed in Chapter 
IV, have led to reduced crime and increased community trust.  
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III. PREDICTIVE POLICING ANALYSIS 
This chapter evaluates and analyzes the targeted investigative approach of the 
NYPD. This approach depends on an analysis of crime hot spots and repeat offenders 
identified by predictive policing algorithms; then, rather than sending more police officers 
in higher-crime areas to suppress crimes with a police presence, predictive policing uses 
NCOs for crime prevention and intervention, as explained in Chapter IV. This chapter 
compares four NYPD precincts before and after the implementation of precision policing—
through arrest, crime, and staffing numbers as well as structure, technology, and use of the 
new investigative approach—to uncover the cause of crime reduction. The analysis reveals 
that violent crime has been declining despite decreased numbers of arrests, summonses, 
and staffing. 
A. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS APPROACHES 
The NYPD has introduced many innovations to policing over the past 50 years, 
particularly after the corruption scandal investigated by the Knapp commission.84 New 
York City suffered an exponential crime increase in the 1980s that could be linked to the 
narcotics trade.85 The spike in the number of murders from 1,392 in 1985 to 2,262 in 1990 
represents this crime surge.86 As detailed in previous chapters, the NYPD employed 
various policing models leading up to precision policing. Previously, the NYPD had 
reacted to acts of violence such as shootings, homicides, or robberies in areas by sending 
more police officers to enforce minor crimes.87 The NYPD believed that less enforcement 
of minor crimes in these areas caused greater, more violent crimes later. At the time, the 
department did not have a database of perpetrators from which to analyze violent 
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recidivists. Moreover, it did not study gang rivalries to understand the root cause of 
retaliatory violence, which would have allowed preemptive intervention.88  
In 2014, after William Bratton became the NYPD police commissioner for a second 
tenure, his primary goal was to mend the police–community relationship while achieving 
crime reduction. Reconstructing such relationships would depend on the identification of 
gangs and the development of a recidivism database thanks to the algorithms used in 
predictive policing.89 
B. CRIME STATISTICS UNDER THE OLD MODEL IN 2013 
For this study, four NYPD precincts were selected because they were the early 
adaptors of the precision policing model in 2014. These precincts lie in three different 
boroughs of NYC and encompass a range of ethnic and racial groups of residents. This 
section analyzes geographic diversity, staffing structure, crime numbers, arrest numbers, 
technology, and training before the adoption of precision policing model.  
1. 33rd Precinct  
The NYPD’s 33rd Precinct lies in the northern part of Manhattan, otherwise known 
as Washington Heights.90 The precinct covers large residential and commercial areas. It is 
culturally rich as residents encompass immigrants from various countries. However, this 
area reflects immigrants predominantly from the Dominican Republic and is densely 
populated and congested. This area is a combination of various multi-family residential 
buildings as well as many small businesses and historic sites.91 Twenty-eight houses of 
worship for many religions lie within the confines of this precinct, and the residents are of 
various racial groups including white, black, Hispanic, and Asian.92  
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In 2013, the precinct staff included 220 personnel comprising 196 police officers, 
31 sergeants, 11 lieutenants, and two captains. At that time, the staffing structure of the 
precinct reflected the old model: 16 police officers and two sergeants worked on the 
Conditions Unit, eight police officers and one sergeant the SNEU, 10 police officers and 
two sergeants the Anti-Crime Unit, and 30 police officers, one sergeant, and one lieutenant 
the Impact Unit. The remainder of the workforce served as patrol officers whose primary 
function was responding to 9-1-1 calls for service.93 In 2013, the NYPD was not 
technologically advanced.94 Police officers had no mobile cellphone devices, but some 
police vehicles had mobile digital terminals to run queries. Neither did police officers have 
body worn cameras (BWCs) or tasers.  
The NYPD has participated in the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system 
established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.95 In 2013, the 927 total UCR crimes 
recorded in this precinct ranked it number 65 out of 77 precincts.96 These crimes included 
two murders, 202 robberies, and 200 felonious assaults. Likewise, there were eight victims 
of non-fatal shootings in seven incidents. The precinct recorded 5,462 arrests and 29,395 
various summonses.97 Figure 3 shows the map of the 33rd Precinct.  
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Figure 3. Map of the NYPD’s 33rd Precinct98 
2. 43rd Precinct  
The NYPD’s 43rd Precinct lies in southeast Bronx, covering approximately four 
square miles, including Soundview, Castle Hill, and Parkchester.99 This precinct is a much 
larger area than the 33rd and 34th Precincts. The majority of the 43rd Precinct is residential, 
but it also has many commercial corridors and malls. The precinct is politically complex 
due to its ethnic makeup. The majority of the precinct’s residents are of Puerto Rican 
descent. This precinct also has a large African-American population as well as residents 
from small migrant communities in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Bangladesh.100  
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In 2013, the precinct staff included 375 personnel comprising 334 police officers, 
34 sergeants, 14 lieutenants, and four captains.101 Its staffing structure reflected the old 
model: 16 police officers and two sergeants were assigned to the Conditions Unit, eight 
police officers and one sergeant to the SNEU, 10 police officers and two sergeants to the 
Anti-Crime Unit, and 30 police officers, one sergeant, and one lieutenant to the Impact 
Unit. The remainder of the workforce served as patrol officers whose primary function was 
responding to 9-1-1 calls for service.102 Like the other NYPD precincts in 2013, the 43rd 
Precinct was not technologically advanced  
In 2013, this precinct reported a total of 2,480 UCR crimes, which ranked it the 
third highest crime district among the 77 precincts.103 These crimes included nine murders, 
586 robberies, and 600 felonious assaults. Non-fatal shootings involved 30 victims in 26 
incidents. The precinct recorded 8,134 arrests and 25,817 various summonses.104 Figure 4 
shows the map of the 43rd Precinct.  
 
101 New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished 
data, November 26, 2019. 
102 New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database. 
103 Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, CompStat. 
104 Bratton, Bilich, and Banks. 
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Figure 4. Map of the NYPD’s 43rd Precinct105 
3. 67th Precinct  
The NYPD’s 67th Precinct lies in the center of Brooklyn and covers the 
neighborhoods of East Flatbush and Remsen Village.106 The precinct covers an area of 
approximately 2.9 square miles, which encompasses many commercial strip malls and 
large residential areas.107 The racial makeup of this precinct’s residential area is 1.3 percent 
white, 88.7 percent African American, 1.1 percent Asian, and 6.6 percent Hispanic.108  
 
105 Source: New York City Police Department, “Find Your Precinct and Sector.” 
106 “67th Precinct,” New York City Police Department, accessed January 11, 2020, https://www1.nyc.
gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/precincts/67th-precinct.page. 
107 “Brooklyn Community District 17,” New York City Planning, accessed January 11, 2020, 
https://communityprofiles.planning.nyc.gov/brooklyn/17. 
108 “Total Population by Mutually Exclusive Race and Hispanic Origin, New York City Neighborhood 




The precinct was staffed with 385 personnel comprising 351 police officers, 35 
sergeants, 11 lieutenants, and two captains.109 In 2013, none of the police officers were 
equipped with police department mobile cellphones. Some police vehicles had mobile 
digital terminals for various database checks, but most officers utilized their handheld very 
high frequency radios for checks such as warrants and license information. In 2013, police 
officers were not equipped with BWCs, departmental cellphones, or tasers.  
In 2013, the staffing structure of the precinct was under the old model: 16 police 
officers and two sergeants were assigned to the Conditions Unit, eight police officers and 
one sergeant to the SNEU, 10 police officers and two sergeants to the Anti-Crime Unit, 
and 30 police officers, one sergeant, and one lieutenant to the Impact Unit. The remainder 
of the workforce served as patrol officers whose primary function was responding to 9-1-1 
calls for service.110  
In 2013, the 67th precinct reported a total of 2,383 UCR crimes, ranking it the fourth 
highest crime district out of 77 precincts.111 These crimes included 11 murders, 519 
robberies, and 569 felonious assaults. Non-fatal shootings involved 93 victims in 63 
incidents. The precinct recorded 7,004 arrests and 42,591 various summonses.112 Figure 5 
shows the map of the 67th Precinct.  
 
109 New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished 
data, November 26, 2019. 
110 New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database. 
111 Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, CompStat. 
112 Bratton, Bilich, and Banks. 
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Figure 5. Map of the NYPD’s 67th Precinct113 
4. 100th Precinct  
The 100th Precinct covers the southern areas of Queens encompassing the 
Rockaways, Breezy Point, and Bell Harbor.114 Regarding racial demographics of this area, 
African Americans make up approximately 44.7 percent, whites 25.5 percent, and many 
other races small percentages of the population.115 This very diverse neighborhood 
contains immigrants from Guyana, Jamaica, Russia, and Ukraine. Most of the precinct is 
residential and attracts many tourists to its beautiful beach during the summer months.116  
The precinct staff included 150 personnel comprising 121 police officers, 22 
sergeants, six lieutenants, and one captain.117 In 2013, the staffing structure of the precinct 
reflected the old model: 16 police officers and two sergeants were assigned to the 
 
113 Source: New York City Police Department, “Find Your Precinct and Sector.” 
114 “100th Precinct,” New York City Police Department, accessed December 14, 2019, https://www1.
nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/precincts/100th-precinct.page. 
115 Official Website of the City of New York, “Total Population.” 
116 New York City Police Department, “100th Precinct.” 
117 New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished 
data, November 26, 2019. 
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Conditions Unit, eight police officers and one sergeant to the SNEU, 10 police officers and 
two sergeants to the Anti-Crime Unit, and 30 police officers, one sergeant, and one 
lieutenant to the Impact unit. The remainder of the workforce served as patrol officers 
whose primary function was responding to 9-1-1 calls for service.118 In 2013, this precinct 
was not technologically advanced. Police officers had no mobile cellphones, BWS, or 
tasers, but some police vehicles had mobile digital terminals to run queries.  
In 2013, the 100th Precinct reported 558 UCR crimes, which ranked it number 75 
out of 77 precincts.119 These crimes included three murders, 61 robberies, and 147 
felonious assaults. There were nine victims of non-fatal shootings in three incidents. The 
precinct recorded 1,861 arrests and 15,185 various summonses.120 Figure 6 shows the map 
of the 100th precinct.  
 
Figure 6. Map of the NYPD’s 100th Precinct121 
 
118 New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database. 
119 Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, CompStat. 
120 Bratton, Bilich, and Banks. 
121 Source: New York City Police Department, “Find Your Precinct and Sector.” 
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C. THE CURRENT APPROACH’S IMPACT ON GANG AND ORGANIZED 
CRIME PROSECUTIONS 
One major change that accompanied precision policing included developing more 
cases under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act to combat 
many organized crimes.122 Precisely identifying gang members involved in organized 
crime built the foundation for prosecuting these cases.123 RICO cases are evidence-based 
and long-term and require extensive interagency collaboration. As the NYPD’s 
Commissioner Shea describes,  
Targeting and dismantling gangs and crews, and preventing the violence so 
often associated with their illegal activities, continues to be among the 
highest priorities for the NYPD. We continue . . . relentlessly with our law 
enforcement partners to identify, arrest, and build the strongest possible 
cases to hold to account anyone who involves themselves in such 
behavior.124 
In coordination with NCOs, Gang and Social Media Analysis and Research Team 
(SMART) Units started to create a recidivism database and develop methodologies for 
learning about repeat offenders. Such technological advances within the police department 
communicated the severity of recidivists to all police officers instead of isolating the 
information among executives and investigators. The department also began collecting 
more DNA evidence and comparing that DNA with similar crimes through forensic 
laboratory work. Moreover, under new approach and with advancements in technology, 
the department has digitized some old investigative techniques such as prisoner debriefing 
to share intelligence and information with stakeholders.  
Under the predictive policing paradigm, identifying gangs and crews to tackle 
repeat offenders falls under the RICO doctrine. For this purpose, the NYPD has developed 
 
122 Department of Justice, “RICO Charges,” in Criminal Resource Manual (Washington, DC: 
Department of Justice, 2020), § 109, https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-109-rico-
charges. 
123 “Leaders of Latin Kings Set Charged in Manhattan Federal Court with Racketeering, Narcotics, and 
Firearms Offenses,” U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, December 5, 2019, 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/leaders-latin-kings-set-charged-manhattan-federal-court-
racketeering-narcotics-and. 
124 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York. 
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an initiative called Ceasefire, which is similar to a Chicago initiative that uses heat maps.125 
Theoretically, its prediction of crimes is combined with intervention to develop better 
social opportunities, particularly for the youngest and most vulnerable segments of society. 
Such crime prediction involves other elements of civil society to intervene in ways other 
than policing, including providing young people with access to public parks and libraries.  
Ceasefire is a comprehensive violence prevention strategy used to address gang 
violence in NYC.126 This strategy promotes coordination and trust among various groups 
including social services, the community, and the police department to openly involve 
members of violent gangs, providing them with various opportunities to remain non-violent 
members of society.127 The message is simple: let gang members know that the NYPD 
wants them alive, safe, and out of the prison system—and they can either stop the violence 
or face real consequences.128 The police department and other involved stakeholders assure 
crew and gang members that they are willing to help and provide services.129 Each member 
identified as a potential catalyst for violence or who could retaliate receives a custom letter 
offering him services and warning him not to carry out violent acts by detailing 
consequences. Presently, the impact of this initiative is unknown because it has been in 
place for too short a time to measure its results.130 
1. 33rd Precinct 
The NYPD has made huge technological strides since 2013. All police officers have 
BWCs, cellphones capable of doing most investigative searches, and tasers. In precincts, 
the NCO model has eliminated specialty units, such as the SNEU and Conditions Unit, as 
 
125 Matt Stroud, “The Minority Report: Chicago’s New Police Computer Predicts Crimes, but Is It 
Racist?,” Verge, February 19, 2014, https://www.theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854/the-minority-report-
this-computer-predicts-crime-but-is-it-racist. 




128 “Collaborative Policing,” New York City Police Department, accessed January 16, 2020, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/administrative/collaborative-policing.page. 
129 New York City Police Department. 
130 New York City Police Department.  
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well as school safety officers as most of these tasks have been absorbed by sector NCOs. 
In 2019, the 33rd Precinct has a total of 185 personnel, comprising 156 police officers, 21 
sergeants, six lieutenants, and two captains, or 16 percent fewer staff members than in 
2013.131 In 2019, a total of 778 UCR crimes were recorded in this precinct, a reduction of 
16.5 percent from the 2013 total of 932, which ranks it at 65 out of 77 precincts.132 These 
crimes included four murders, 146 robberies, and 201 felonious assaults. Non-fatal 
shootings involved seven victims in 65 incidents. The precinct recorded 2,209 arrests and 
14,041 various summonses.133 Arrests were down 65 percent since the inception of 
precision policing. Figure 7 depicts UCR crime trends for the 33rd Precinct from 2010 to 
2019.  
 
Figure 7. 33rd Precinct Crime Trends134 
 
131 New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished 
data, November 26, 2019. 
132 Dermot F. Shea, Michael J. LiPetri, and Terence A. Monahan, CompStat: Year End 2019 
Preliminary (New York: New York City Police Department, January 1, 2020), 136. 
133 Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan. 




















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
37 
2. 43rd Precinct  
The staffing structure in 2019 for the 43rd Precinct features 244 police officers, 21 
sergeants, five lieutenants, and two captains, totaling 275 assigned personnel and 
representing a 26.7 percent decrease in staff since 2013.135 In 2019, a total of 1,863 UCR 
crimes were recorded in this precinct, ranking it 11 out of 77 precincts and representing a 
25 percent decrease in crime since the start of precision policing.136 These crimes included 
five murders, 359 robberies, and 557 felonious assaults. Non-fatal shootings involved 15 
victims in 13 incidents. The precinct recorded 4,007 arrests and 19,219 various 
summonses.137 Figure 8 depicts UCR crime trends for the 43rd Precinct from 2010 to 2019.  
 
Figure 8. 43rd Precinct Crime Trends138 
 
135 New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished 
data, November 26, 2019. 
136 Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, CompStat. 
137 Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan. 
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3. 67th Precinct  
The staffing structure in 2019 for the 67th Precinct has 283 police officers, 28 
sergeants, eight lieutenants, and two captains, totaling 321 personnel.139 In 2019, a total of 
1,630 UCR crimes in this precinct gave it a ranking of 14 out of 77 precincts, or a 32 
percent decrease in crime since the adoption of precision policing.140 These crimes 
included seven murders, 235 robberies, and 485 felonious assaults. Non-fatal shootings 
affected 39 victims in 29 incidents. The precinct recorded 4,038 arrests and 20,392 various 
summonses.141 Figure 9 depicts UCR crime trends for the 67th Precinct from 2010 to 2019. 
 
Figure 9. 67th Precinct Crime Trends142 
 
139 New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished 
data, November 26, 2019. 
140 Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, CompStat. 
141 Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan. 
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4. 100th Precinct 
The staffing structure in 2019 for the 100th Precinct has 116 police officers, 18 
sergeants, six lieutenants, and one captain, totaling 141 personnel or a 6 percent reduction 
in staff since 2013.143 In 2019, a total of 452 UCR crimes were recorded in this precinct, 
ranking it number 69 out of 77 precincts and representing a 19.2 percent reduction in crime 
since 2013.144 These crimes included two murders, 40 robberies, and 144 felonious 
assaults. Non-fatal shootings affected five victims in three incidents. The precinct recorded 
1,358 arrests and 11,071 various summonses.145 Figure 10 depicts UCR crime trends for 
the 100th Precinct from 2010 to 2019, and Table 1 summarizes the statistics for key crimes 
in all four precincts. 
 
Figure 10. 100th Precinct Crime Trends146 
 
143 New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished 
data, November 26, 2019. 
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Table 1. UCR Crimes in Four NYPD Precincts, 2013 vs. 2019147 
 33rd Precinct 43rd Precinct 67th Precinct 100th Precinct 
Year 2013 2019 2013 2019 2013 2019 2013 2019 
Total UCR 927 778 2,480 1,293 2,383 1,630 558 452 
Murder 2 4 9 5 11 7 3 2 
Shootings 7 6 26 13 63 29 3 3 
Shooting 
Victims 8 7 30 15 92 33 9 3 
Robbery 202 146 586 359 519 235 61 40 
Assault 200 201 600 557 569 485 147 144 
Arrest 5,462 2,209 8,134 4,007 7,004 4,038 1,861 1,358 
Summonses 29,395 14,041 25,817 19,219 42,591 20,392 15,185 10,506 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
This study has demonstrated that the UCR crimes all dropped in the four selected 
precincts. UCR crimes fell by 16.5 percent for the 33rd Precinct, 48 percent for the 43rd, 
32 percent for the 67th, and 32 percent for the 100th. Additionally, in three out of four 
precincts, shootings dropped sharply: the 43rd precinct decreased by 54 percent, the 67th 
by 48 percent, and the 100th by 33 percent, while the 33rd saw no change. Likewise, the 
number of arrests declined since the implementation of precision policing: the 33rd 
Precinct saw 65 percent fewer arrests, the 43rd 58 percent fewer, the 67th 42 percent fewer, 
and the 100th 36 percent fewer. These findings suggest that crime reduction followed the 
new model in all four of these districts across most categories, even as the number of 
officers dropped.  
 
147 Adapted from Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, CompStat, 123; Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, CompStat. 
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It would seem that the number of personnel alone does not have any major impact 
on reducing crime because staffing has continually declined within these precincts just as 
crime has. There have been several changes in approach toward community interactions; 
the creation of NCOs, development of hot spots, and predictive analysis for recidivism are 
key components of precision policing. The number of factors considered for this thesis 
shows that crime reduction was not achieved by increasing the number of police officers, 
technological advancements, arrests, or summonses. However, this subject requires further 
studies and research to consider other potential factors such as socioeconomic changes and 
education. By merely looking at crime trends, a conclusion could be drawn that predictive 
policing was responsible for reducing crime in NYC. However, it would be unreasonable 
to credit precision policing without considering many other factors.  
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IV. COMMUNITY OUTREACH ANALYSIS 
This chapter analyzes the trust between the police and communities in NYC using 
Civilian Complaint Review Board complaints as a measure. As with the previous chapter, 
this chapter compares the four selected precincts before and after the implementation of 
the NCO program to measure the program’s effect. This chapter finds that NCOs have 
increased community trust. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Over the course of policing history, many different policing models have been 
employed, but community policing has been the most popular model thus far. Its critics 
have questioned whether it reduces crime or appeases communities with reduced 
enforcement. As Sir Robert Peel, founder of the Metropolitan Police, stated in 1829, “The 
basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder and the ability of 
police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.”148 The 
public’s approval of which Peel spoke derives from elected officials in the form of policies. 
Prior to 2014, policing became divisive in America because of continued proactive policing 
measures for decades that exploded in three high-profile incidents across the nation: 
Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Kimani Gray.149 This thesis presents a historical 
perspective of the NYPD’s various models of policing that evolved into today’s NCO 
program, starting with CPOP. A detailed discussion of CPOP appeared in Chapter I of this 
thesis. Broken windows–style policing followed it.  
1. Broken Windows Theory 
The broken windows theory of policing emerged from George Kelling’s claim that 
by averting minor crimes, more violent crimes could be prevented.150 After being 
 
148 “Sir Robert Peel’s Principles of Law Enforcement,” Durham Constabulary, accessed February 9, 
2020, https://www.durham.police.uk/about-us/documents/peels_principles_of_law_enforcement.pdf. 
149 Charles M. Blow, “The Perfect Victim Pitfall,” New York Times, December 3, 2014, https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/charles-blow-first-michael-brown-now-eric-garner.html. 
150 Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter?, 32. 
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appointed in 1994, William Bratton used this strategy of policing, which proved successful 
in reducing quality-of-life issues and violent crimes, thus making New York a more livable 
city.151 However, over the course of the next 20 years, an astonishing level of enforcement 
and obsessive use of the stop, question, and frisk procedure unraveled the trust between the 
NYPD and the public.152 A policing tool known as a “Terry stop” was brought to light in 
a landmark decision by the Supreme Court in 1968 in Terry v. Ohio, ultimately causing the 
NYPD to change its approach.153  
The NYPD refers to Terry stops as stop, question, and frisk (SQF) reports. Not only 
did they continue years after Bratton had implemented them, but Raymond Kelly turned 
them into one of the key performance measurement tools for police officers. For Terry 
stops, police officers need only “reasonable suspicion that the stopped person has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a penal felony or a misdemeanor.”154 
Moreover, the officers could officially use a reasonable amount of force. In 2013, the last 
year of Ray Kelly’s commissionership, the NYPD generated 191,851 SQF reports but 
reached its highest levels in 2011 with 685,724 citizens stopped.155  
In January 2014, when Kelly vacated the top cop position, trust between the police 
and their communities was at its lowest level. Trust is vital to keeping residents safe and to 
getting help from the residents in solving and reducing crimes. The NYPD also faced a 
lawsuit in Floyd v. the City of New York. Judge Scheindlin found the application of “Stop 
and Frisk by the NYPD . . . a violation of citizens’ constitutional rights.”156 In this lawsuit, 
the plaintiff asserted that his Fourth and 14th Amendment rights had been violated with the 
 
151 Bratton and Knobler, Turnaround. 
152 Walton, “Zero Tolerance Policing,” 74.  
153 Terry v. Ohio, 392 S. Ct. 1 (1968), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/392/1/. 
154 New York City Police Department, Investigative Encounters: Requests for Information, Common 
Law Right of Inquiry and Level 3 Stops, Procedure No. 212-11 (New York: New York City Police 
Department, October 19, 2018), 16, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/patrol-guide.page. 
155 “Stop-and-Frisk Data,” New York Civil Liberties Union, January 2, 2012, https://www.nyclu.org/
en/stop-and-frisk-data. 
156 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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use of an SQF.157 The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, and the 14th Amendment grants equal civil rights to citizens.158 This 
landmark case highlighted tensions between public safety and the liberty of citizens, 
particularly over the use of SQF as a policing tool, and scrutinized its overuse, especially 
among minority communities.159 The lawsuit brought many changes and reforms within 
the NYPD including the acquisition of BWCs and the appointment of an independent 
monitor by the federal government.160 William Bratton was appointed in 2014 as Kelly’s 
successor in part due to the Floyd case.161 A number of large protests due to nationwide 
events welcomed Bratton on his return to office.162 Overriding Kelly’s legacy, Bratton’s 
second commissionership saw SQFs fall to 45,787 in 2014 and decline further to their 
lowest levels in 2018, with only 1,683 recorded.163  
Bratton also introduced initiatives, such as the neighborhood coordination officer 
program, to develop a positive image of the police by advocating to the public that crime 
reduction is a shared responsibility.164 Bratton claimed that implementing NCOs would 
increase trust between the police and communities. He distinguished NCOs from CPOPs 
by involving the entire police department, not only a small select group of police officers. 
NCOs set out to fulfill three goals: reduce crime, promote trust, and solve problems jointly 
at the local level.165  
 
157 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540.  
158 “The Constitution,” White House, accessed January 12, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-
the-white-house/the-constitution/. 
159 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540.  
160 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540; Jessica L. Fangman, “Stop the ‘Stop and Frisk?’ How Floyd v. City of 
New York Will Limit the Power of Law Enforcement across the Nation,” Public Interest Law Reporter 19, 
no. 1 (Fall 2013), http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol19/iss1/9.  
161 Fangman, “Stop the ‘Stop and Frisk?’” 
162 Blow, “The Perfect Victim Pitfall.” 
163 New York Civil Liberties Union, “Stop-and-Frisk Data.” 
164 William J. Bratton, “Cops Count, Police Matter: Preventing Crime and Disorder in the 21st 
Century,” Lecture No. 1286 (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, March 27, 2018), https://www.
heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/HL1286.pdf. 
165 New York City Police Department, The Police Commissioner’s Report, vol. 80, no.1–2 (New York: 
New York City Police Department, January 2017), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/
publications/pc-report-2017.pdf. 
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2. Community Outreach through Neighborhood Coordination Officers  
In 2014, the NYPD initiated the precision policing model with its neighborhood 
coordination program and gradually restructured the police department.166 This 
restructuring helped to create NCOs within the precincts. It further eliminated most small 
units responsible for proactive enforcement.167 With the implementation of NCOs, new 
sector boundaries have been established within each precinct.168 A sector is a small 
geographical area within a precinct, and a precinct might have three to five sectors, 
depending on its size. Each sector has two NCOs assigned to address problems, and they 
are equipped with the resources of other agencies to provide guidance and assistance in 
resolving issues. In addition to two NCOs, two to four cars patrol the sector. The steady 
sector cars are driven by patrol officers who respond to 9-1-1 calls.169 Finally, response 
autos, whose primary function is to backfill and supplement the steady sector cars, also 
patrol each sector. 
The NYPD’s new model of staffing designates the NCOs as the quarterbacks in all 
police-involved efforts.170 The NCOs’ primary goal is to fight crime and address minor 
community issues including conditions that could escalate into crime and disorder. NCOs 
design strategies to accomplish these goals jointly by developing plans with community 
and police partners.171 The NCO implementation pioneered the use of community meetings 
called “Build the Block.”172 Each NCO sector holds meetings where members of the 
community engage in joint problem-solving to address neighborhood crime and quality-
of-life issues.173 These meetings provide a forum for the community on a small scale to 
 
166 Susan P. Crawford and Laura Adler, “Culture Change and Digital Technology: The NYPD under 
Commissioner William Bratton, 2014–2016,” Publication No. 2016-13 (Cambridge, MA: Berkman Klein 
Center, September 12, 2016), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2839004. 
167 Crawford and Adler. 
168 Crawford and Adler. 
169 Crawford and Adler. 
170 Crawford and Adler. 
171 Crawford and Adler. 
172 “Find Your Build the Block Meeting,” New York City Police Department, accessed January 12, 
2020, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/find-your-meeting.page. 
173 New York City Police Department. 
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learn about crime and safety concerns, as well as a voice to develop solutions for such 
issues.174 As NCOs view local problems on a small scale, they also assist in identifying 
high-risk offenders, victims, and locations to target for special attention in the form of 
increased police presence, intervention, or enforcement or a change to the physical 
environment to reduce the likelihood of the problem occurring.  
3. The Citizen Complaint Review Board 
The NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) was established in 1993.175 
It is an oversight agency that functions independently and investigates complaints from 
civilians for alleged use of excessive force, abuse of authority, offensive language, and 
discourtesy.176 The board retains the powers of investigation, subpoena, prosecution, and 
mediation to resolve complaints.177 The CCRB represents an external oversight mechanism 
that provides remedies for citizens who are unhappy with the police, and it also instills a 
feeling of accountability for the NYPD. For this thesis, the CCRB acts as a proxy measure 
of trust between the citizens of NYC and the police department. For all of NYC in 2013, 
the CCRB received a total of 5,388 complaints, which have been on a steady decline to 
4,745 in 2018.178  
The following subsections compare the same four precincts discussed in Chapter 
III to gauge whether the presence of NCOs has affected the number of CCRB complaints. 
Overall, the CCRB investigated 643 fewer complaints, which is an indication of increased 
trust between the citizens of NYC and the police. Figure 11 depicts the number of CCRB 
complaints for the entire city from 2006 to 2019. 
 
174 New York City Police Department. 
175 “About CCRB,” New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, accessed December 18, 2019, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/about/about.page. 
176 New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board.  
177 New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board.  
178 New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “Appendix A: CCRB Complaint Data 2013” 





Figure 11. Complaints Received by the CCRB, 2006–2019179 
a. 33rd Police Precinct  
In 2013, police officers assigned to the 33rd Precinct received a total of 314 CCRB 
complaints, which dropped to 216 in 2018.180 
b. 43rd Police Precinct  
In 2013, police officers assigned to the 43rd Precinct received a total of 637 CCRB 
complaints, which fell to 436 at the end of 2018.181 
 
179 Source: “Complaint Activity Map,” New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, accessed 
January 16, 2020, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/policy/complaint-activity-map.page. 
180 New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2013”; New York City 
Civilian Complaint Review Board, “Appendix: CCRB Complaint Data 2018” (New York: New York City 
Civilian Complaint Review Board, 2019), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/policy_pdf/
annual_bi-annual/2018_annual-appendix.pdf. 
181 New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2013”; New York City 
Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2018.”  
49 
c. 67th Police Precinct  
In 2013, police officers assigned to the 67th Precinct received a total of 672 CCRB 
complaints, which declined to 517 at the end of 2018.182 
d. 100th Police Precinct  
In 2013, police officers assigned to the 100th Precinct received a total of 28 CCRB 
complaints, which dropped to 27 at the end of 2018, a small reduction to an already low 
history of complaints.183 
B. CONCLUSION 
A statistical analysis of CCRB complaints filed by the citizens of NYC shows that 
the number of complaints has decreased citywide. Additionally, the number of these 
complaints have decreased in the four precincts in question. A conclusion could be drawn 
that because complaints have dropped, trust must have increased. However, before 
reaching that conclusion, several factors must also be considered. The decreased number 
of complaints could also be a direct result of decreased enforcement. Chapter III of this 
thesis showed that the number of arrests, summonses, and SQF reports have all decreased 
tremendously. The reduced number of CCRB complaints could be a direct result of fewer 
enforcement interactions instead of increased trust between the police and communities. 
Without considering all other factors, it would be unjust to credit the NCO program with 
increased trust while using CCRB as a measure.  
  
 
182 New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2013”; New York City 
Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2018.”  
183 New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2013”; New York City 
Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2018.”  
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V. IS PRECISION POLICING A SMART PRACTICE? 
This thesis has examined various phases of NYPD’s policing models. Although 
precision policing has been touted for effectively reducing crime and improving the trust 
between the police and the public, it has not been extensively studied. Thus, the intent here 
has been to study its value and whether it has the potential for other contexts. To do so, this 
thesis used the smart practice concept.  
A complete description of a smart practice involves four fundamentals: the 
explanation of a problem, the explanation of a practice, strengths of the practice, and 
vulnerabilities of the practice.184 First, Eugene Bardach defines a practice as “a tangible 
and visible behavior.”185 A practice could also be seen as a description of how such a 
practice requires an action to reach an objective. Bardach explains further that “some ideas 
are particularly clever. The practices that embody them we call ‘smart practices.’”186 The 
simple tool in a smart practice is its potential to reach a goal at low cost.187 Bardach 
explains that “a smart practice is made up of (1) the latent potential for creating value, plus 
(2) the mechanism for extracting and focusing that potential.”188 A few such practices 
implemented by the NYPD in the precision policing model follow. 
1. Evidence-Based Policing to Build Long-Term Cases  
The practice of building evidence based on long-term cases has been effective in 
the new approach to combat organized crimes. The NYPD has been developing a 
recidivism database to identify the small group of people who are responsible for most of 
the violent crimes. The database is being used to build long-term, evidence-based cases 
that fall under RICO statutes for arresting violent gang members. Such cases require 
extensive interagency collaboration.  
 
184 Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis. 
185 Bardach, 126. 
186 Bardach, 126. 
187 Bardach. 
188 Bardach, 131. 
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2. Interagency Collaboration  
The NYPD has worked with multiple federal and local law enforcement agencies 
to develop and prosecute long-term RICO cases. The creation of violence reduction task 
forces within the new investigative model—which consists of precinct detectives, patrol 
officers, gang detectives, narcotics detectives, and federal agencies—to build cases against 
the most violent groups has been proven comprehensive strategy. These cases cannot be 
built without coordination within the agency because the structure of criminally organized 
groups is built through such coordination. Interagency coordination is also an important 
ingredient as prosecutions for RICO cases are led by federal courts. 
3. Developing Build-the-Block Meetings with NCOs 
NCOs view local issues on a local scale by holding joint problem-solving meetings 
with the community called Build the Block. These meetings are held at the sector level, 
which covers a very small area, to engage community members with joint problem-solving. 
These meeting also provide a forum where the community on a small scale learns about 
crime and safety concerns as well as voices solutions for such issues.189 The goal of the 
NCOs is to resolve many issues with interventions before enforcement. 
Precision policing combines the two concepts of predictive analysis and community 
policing. It has rearranged the entire structure of the NYPD around information and data 
science to develop better investigations of the suspects responsible for most crimes. For 
the implementation of precision policing, the NYPD modernized its intelligence and data 
systems and promoted community outreach through NCOs. Organizational changes 
affected every patrol precinct as well as all investigative entities by unifying all criminal 
investigative entities and creating better interagency collaboration. The development of the 
NCO program has shifted the focus to community collaboration. In a crime statistic 
briefing, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio credited precision policing with the 
downward crime trend through the first half of 2019: “What’s working is neighborhood 
 
189 New York City Police Department, “Find Your Build the Block Meeting.” 
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policing. What’s working is precision policing.”190 John Seabrook wrote in the New Yorker 
that “zero tolerance has been replaced by ‘precision policing’ and a focus on pacifying 
violent groups. Stop-and-frisk is on the way out, and violent crime continues to go 
down.”191  
Analyzing crime statistics and CCRB data from before and after the implementation 
of precision policing demonstrates that crime has been on a constant decline, and fewer 
complaints are being made by the citizens against the police, possibly suggesting that trust 
between the police and community has increased. However, this increased trust may have 
other contributing variables, as described in Chapter IV. The new approach does not use 
arrest numbers as a measure of performance for police officers; it gives police officers the 
power of discretion to resolve many small issues without taking an enforcement action 
through mediation by NCOs. With this approach, it is vital to develop a mindset of 
community outreach among the entire police department while accurately identifying 
elements that are causing most violence—to take precise enforcement action.  
This model of policing has been implemented for five years, but little scholarly 
research has been dedicated to evaluating this policy. At the five-year anniversary of its 
implementation and given the sample of variables, this model seems to be working and can 
be used as a smart practice for other jurisdictions.  
  
 
190 Richard Khavkine, “Murders Plummet to Record Low; Citywide, Crime Dips Again,” Chief, July 
12, 2019, http://thechiefleader.com/news/news_of_the_week/murders-plummet-to-record-low-citywide-
crime-dips-again/article_89ced4fe-a296-11e9-a0b4-0b920fd5782d.html. 
191 John Seabrook, “Operation Ceasefire and the Unlikely Advent of Precision Policing,” New Yorker, 
September 26, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/operation-ceasefire-and-the-
unlikely-advent-of-precision-policing. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
The NYPD cleverly combined two models of policing into one. With predictive 
policing analysis and the NCO program, crime has decreased substantially in NYC. The 
number of police personnel assigned to precincts has also decreased, which means that 
crime reduction is being achieved with even fewer police on the streets. Additionally, the 
number of arrests and summonses have been reduced since the implementation of precision 
policing. Finally, based on this model, a conclusion can be made that predicting crime is 
not a complete solution without interdiction, and interdiction must be achieved using 
NCOs—who have received a tremendous level of support from the upper police brass, are 
given the freedom to carry out mediation and the responsibility to solve crimes, and are 
well aware that these interventions rely on relationships with community members.  
Another part of the research evaluated the public’s trust of the NYPD using CCRB 
complaints as an indicator. Trust between communities and the police is also an important 
element for collaborative crime reduction efforts. The research found that since the 
implementation of new philosophy known as the NCO program, trust has increased. This 
increased trust, however, might correlate with other factors, such as technological 
advancements, the issuance of BWCs to all officers, fewer arrests, fewer summonses, and 
fewer SQF reports.  
This research aimed to answer whether this model could be used as a blueprint for 
other jurisdictions to follow and whether this policy has any consequences and implications 
for the residents of NYC. The findings are inconclusive and will require further research 
to rule out other factors as potential contributors in crime reduction and increased trust.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
The crime reduction strategy implemented by the NYPD along with community 
policing seems like a practical solution, as highlighted in this thesis. Some unanswered 
questions in this thesis could be explored in future research. The following subsections 
offer recommendations for future research that analyzes precision policing in greater depth.  
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1. Intervening Variables in Crime Reduction  
In this thesis, internal policing factors were considered and credited for crime 
reduction, including predictive analysis, focused investigations, the creation of recidivism 
databases, and advancements in technology and computer science. Other factors—such as 
socioeconomic changes, increased education among the residents, greater awareness of 
consequences of crimes through social media, more employment opportunities, and higher 
income per capita—may also contribute to crime reduction. These contributors could be 
researched and studied to determine their specific impact on crime reduction. Finally, this 
thesis focused on major UCR crimes, but future work could examine whether precision 
policing has had an impact on less serious but still important crimes such as graffiti, public 
urination, loitering, and prostitution.  
2. Measuring Trust  
This study used one indicator of trust: the number of CCRB complaints filed against 
police officers by the residents of NYC. But could trust have increased due to the 
acquisition of BWCs or due to fewer arrests, summonses, and SQF reports? Might CCRB 
complaints have been reduced with fewer police contacts with residents? Might community 
meetings, Build-the-Block interactions, and various other interactions between the police 
and citizens, which do not result in arrests or summonses, be considered alternative 
interactions between the police and community? The NYPD has not surveyed communities 
to measure such trust. However, to evaluate the impact on crime, New Yorkers’ trust in the 
NYPD, the effects on investigations, and the attitudes of NYPD police officers toward 
neighborhood coordination, the RAND Corporation has initiated a study of the NYPD’s 
neighborhood coordination program.192 The RAND study began in 2018 and will continue 
until 2021. The results of this research will be publicly released in 2021, and future 
researchers may be able to build on them.  
 
192 “What Is the Impact of NYPD’s Neighborhood Policing?,” RAND Corporation, January 2019, 
https://doi.org/10.7249/CP919-2019-01. RAND expects to provide preliminary results to the NYPD in 
2019 with the goal of releasing its final report to the public in 2021. 
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3. Means for Outreach  
Predicting crime has been a valuable strategy for police in prevention and 
enforcement. But are there other ways to reach out to young people, particularly those who 
live in poor communities and are more vulnerable to joining gangs and increasing violence? 
Might the predictive policing model be used to predict the most vulnerable individuals and 
areas but, instead of solving the issue with policing, using civic organizations for 
engagement and providing services?  
The predictive analysis and policing tool could be used to develop better social 
opportunities. If a neighborhood is prone to crime and violence, and policing prediction 
shows vulnerabilities, neighborhood investments such as more parks and playgrounds and 
educational programs, rather than heavy policing, could lead residents in a positive 
direction. The first step after identifying juvenile crews and gangs must be intervention—
instead of enforcement and prosecution—to provide social services and counseling. 
4. Education in Schools  
Many young people do not understand or realize the severity of the crimes they 
commit. The police department should focus more on establishing an educational program 
in schools to teach children the types of crime and the consequences of committing crimes. 
This could deter many adolescents from becoming involved in criminal activities.  
B. CONCLUSION  
This research presented a case study of the precision policing model implemented 
by the NYPD in 2014. The case study focused on crime reduction achieved through 
predictive analysis and community trust through neighborhood coordination. This study 
was conducted by selecting four NYC police precincts in four disparate boroughs of NYC, 
consisting of various racial groups as residents. The first part of the study determined that 
all major crimes have been reduced since the implementation of this model. The reduction 
in violent crimes was achieved even with fewer police officers, arrests, summonses, and 
SQF reports. The second part of the study measured community trust in these selected 
precincts using civilian complaint trends reported by the CCRB, which were used as a 
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primary indicator of trust. By analyzing crime statistics and the CCRB data from before 
and after the implementation of precision policing, this thesis concludes that because crime 
has been on a constant decline and fewer complaints are being made by the citizens against 
the police, trust between the police and community has increased. This research suggests 
that other municipalities may wish to adopt precision policing as a smart practice, blending 
predictive analysis with community outreach and prevention.  
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